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The first part of this paper provides a systematic discussion of the structural 
problems of competition on financial markets as observed from the demand and 
from the supply side, using a diagnostic framework. Potential impediments to 
competition are concentration, entry barriers, lack of transparency, product 
complexity, switching and search costs, financial illiteracy, lack of consumer power 
and weak intermediaries. In response to such financial market failures, we suggest 
a number of possible policy reactions. The second part of the paper investigates 
ways to measure competition and provides empirical figures on banking competition 
in 101 separate countries and assesses the market structure as monopolistic (or a 
perfect cartel), perfectly competitive or monopolistic competitive. Also, banking 
competition is explained, using explanatory variables of market structure, 
contestability, inter-industry competition, and institutional and macro economic 
conditions. This analysis provides possible instruments for reform in order to help 
promote competition. Next, the impact of banking consolidation is examined. Finally, 
developments in competition are observed over time, generally pointing to a 
downward trend.  
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1  Introduction 
 
This paper consists of two parts. The first discusses structural characteristics of the financial 
markets including potential obstacles that may hinder competition, whereas the second deals with 
measuring and explaining competition, the impact of consolidation and changes in competition 
over time.  
 
Claessens (2008) provides a splendid introduction to the theory on competition in the financial 
sector, addresses implications for competition policy and gives an excellent overview of the 
literature on this subject. Rather than run the risk of repeating parts of his argument, we refer to 
Claessens’ paper for the general setting of competition in the financial sector. Further, we aim to 
expand on his introduction by presenting an overview of the structural features of financial 
markets which may impair competition, focusing especially on underlying microeconomic market 
failures and suggesting possible solutions. We use a diagnostic framework to investigate the 
typical structure of the financial sector, distinguishing between supply and demand 
characteristics. Weaknesses at the supply side are (in)formal entry barriers (e.g. large scale 
economies and brand names), the heterogeneity of bank products and their complexity, the 
sometimes limited numbers of suppliers, and cross-ownership and bank productions’ network 
properties. Possible obstacles at the demand side are high search and switching costs, the opaque 
nature of pricing and quality of financial products, and financial illiteracy of consumers. A further 
problem is the weakly functioning markets of intermediaries. Given the potential weaknesses of 
the financial market structure, we suggest a number of possible policy reactions to these market 
failures. 
 
The structure of the financial markets provides information on potential threats to competition. 
However, structure itself does not impair competition. It is the conduct of financial institutions 
that determines competitive behaviour. To assess the real situation on the financial markets in 
terms of competition, we need to measure the latter. This paper provides estimates of the degree 
of banking competition in 101 countries. Further, it tests for each country whether its market 
structure is either monopolistic (or a perfect cartel), perfectly competitive or monopolistic 
competitive. A next step is to explain each country’s level of competition, using explanatory 
variables of market structure, contestability, inter-industry competition, and institutional and 
macro economic conditions. Determining what drives competition and, hence, observing which 
different feature across countries are crucial, helps in developing competitive policies and 
regulation further. Finally, we observe how competition develops over time.  
   3 
The setup of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes structural problems of competition on 
financial markets, while Section 3 develops possible policy reaction to financial market failures. 
Section 4 discusses how competition should be defined and measured, while the next section 
provides empirical results of the competition measure for the banking markets in 101 countries. 
Section 6 explains the observed banking competition in 76 countries, examining a large set of 
potential determinants of competition. The next section investigates the impact of consolidation 
by assessing the market power of larger banks compared to that of smaller ones. Section 8 
examines changes in banking competition over time, seeking for upward or downwards trends. 
The last section summarizes, and provides policy recommendations. 
 
2 Structural  problems  of  competition on financial markets  
 
The diagnostic framework developed in CPB (2003) enables us to assess whether a given market 
structure harbours impediments to competition. Structural problems promote the occurrence of 
supernormal profits during a substantial period of time, in comparison to more competitive 
market structures. ‘Supernormal’ refers to profits that exceed a market-conforming rate of risk-
adjusted return on capital, while ‘substantial period of time’ typically reflects several years. We 
apply this framework to the financial markets. Note that structure itself does not impair 
competition. It is the conduct of financial institutions that determines competitive behaviour. But 
structure may create the temptation which incites exploitation of market power. 
 
Table 1   Determinants of imperfect competition 
  Coordinated factors  Unilateral factors  
Supply side factors    
Essential Few  firms  Few  firms 
  High entry and exit barriers  High entry barriers 
 Frequent  interaction  Heterogeneous  products 
Important Transparency  Structural  links 
 Symmetry  Adverse  selection 
Demand side factors    
  Low firm-level elasticity of demand 
(incl. switching costs and lock-in effects 
Ditto 
  Stable demand  Imperfection in financial advice 
 
Supply side factors 
The diagnostic framework contains a list of coordinated and unilateral factors that increase the 
probability of a tight oligopoly, see Table 1. Coordinated factors refer to explicit or tacit 
collusion, while unilateral factors refer to actions undertaken by individual firms without any 
form of coordination with other firms.  
   4 
High concentration is conducive to the realization of supernormal profits, according to the 
traditional economic theory. A more recent and dynamic view considers that high concentration 
may also be the result of heavy competition forcing the market to consolidate and that it is 
therefore difficult to draw clear conclusions from concentration in the financial industry. 
 
High entry barriers have long been recognized as an obstacle to competition. Although many 
formal barriers in financial markets have been removed over time in many countries, informal 
entry barriers are quite common. The existence of large scale economies in many financial 
industries, due to relatively large fixed costs, makes a hindrance for new entries. Due to 
developments in informational technologies, increases in regulatory, accounting and legal 
requirements (e.g. IFRS, Basel II, Solvency II), the high costs of developing new products and so 
on, the optimal size of financial firms is ever increasing (e.g. Bikker and Gorter, 2008). The 
importance of brand names, supporting confidence in the respective financial firms, has a similar 
result. A large scale is also necessary for the supply of certain specific services to wholesale 
firms, such as merger and take-over advice, the equity and bond issuance management, and the 
construction of complex investment products.  
 
Frequent interaction, transparency (with respect to competitors) and symmetry (in terms of equal 
cost structures) are beneficial to a tight oligopoly, since they make it easier for firms to coordinate 
their actions and to detect and punish deviations from the (explicitly or tacitly) pre-agreed 
behaviour. Although frequent interaction is common and sometimes unavoidable (e.g. in the case 
of efficient payment systems), cost structures of financial markets are quite opaque.  
 
Heterogeneous products make it easier for firms to raise prices independently of competitors, as 
clients are less likely to choose for, or switch to, other firms in response to price differences. Here 
we observe a second severe weakness of financial markets. Most financial products are quite 
complicated in practice and carry high switching costs. Payment accounts become easily more 
complex owing to varying tariff structures and services, while savings and deposits accounts may 
carry diverging withdrawal conditions. Mortgage loans are complicated by redemption rules and 
the frequency and timing of interest payments. The sophistication of mortgages increases when 
they are combined with life insurance policies or where redemption is based on investment 
portfolios. Life insurance, pension and (mutual) investment products are generally far more 
complicated than the basic banking products. Bank services for wholesale clients usually show an 
even higher level of sophistication, although, of course, those clients are also more professional. 
Financial institutions offer a wide range of heterogeneous products, most probably in respond to 
market demands, but in addition, they may well have purposely raised product complexity to be 
able to exploit monopolistic competition. An incentive to offer more transparent products seems   5 
absent. This potential weakness of financial markets is aggravated by the behaviour of the clients 
of financial institutions, as discussed below.  
 
Structural links between firms such as cross-ownership would give firms a stake in each others’ 
performance, thus softening competition. Such links between financial institutions are quite 
common in European countries, but less in the US. Information about risks (and the lack of it) 
plays a crucial role in markets for financial products. Asymmetric information plays a major role 
in lending. Particularly in lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), some local 
banks are far better informed than others due to long-lasting and close relationships with clients 
and the benefit of local presence. This severely limits banking competition, but may have gains in 
terms of access to external financing.
2 In the case of life insurance, adverse selection may play a 
role when consumers have more information regarding their life expectancy than insurance 
companies. Adverse selection may lead to higher price-cost margins. 
 
Its network property makes the payment market special. Banks need to cooperate in developing 
technical standards for automatic processing, which adds substantially to market efficiency. Of 
course, competition may be limited under such an arrangement, due to the trade-off against 
efficiency, though not absent (NMa, 2006). This is also observed in other financial markets with 
network properties. Drawbacks of standardisation may be increase of entry barriers, risks for 
illegitimate coordination and a disincentive for innovation. 
 
All in all, we observe a number of supply conditions that may contribute to (tacit) collusion and 
make oligopoly on financial markets more likely than perfect competition. Such dubious 
conditions are potential market distortions and regulation may be needed to reduce their 
disruption of competition.  
 
Demand side factors 
Demand-side factors also affect the intensity of competition, see Table 1. As above, we 
distinguish coordinated and unilateral factors. The elasticity of residual demand determines how 
attractive it is for a firm to change its prices unilaterally. The firm may relinquish a price 
agreement, if only demand responds sufficiently strongly to price changes. In the absence of 
coordination among firms, low elasticity of demand will also help to keep prices above 
competitive levels, as in that case the loss of sales caused by a price increase will be small. High 
search and switching costs contribute to low firm-level demand elasticity. Stable, predictable 
                                                 
2 The stronger banking competition is, the less banks are inclined to invest in lasting relationships, as their 
clients may be snatched by competitors before they have re-earned their investment (Petersen and Rajan, 
1995).   6 
demand makes it easier for firms to collude in order to keep prices high, since cheating by one or 
more firms will be easier to detect than in the case of volatile demand. 
 
The elasticity of residual demand for financial services is limited, in practice, as substitutes are 
rare. Bank savings, investment funds and life insurance policies (such as annuities) are, in 
principle, substitutes for each other, but only in a limited way since their characteristics differ 
substantially in terms of risk, liquidity and tax treatment. For other financial services, substitutes 
are absent. Foreign competition may help to alleviate this problem. However, in practice, cross-
border competition is often limited, particularly for consumers. Entry by foreign banks may help 
but in practice remains limited in many markets and segments, probably due to differences in 
legal, regulatory and institutional structures, consumer preferences, national habits, et cetera. 
 
High switching costs are typical for many financial products such as mortgage loans, life 
insurance policies and pension arrangements, since contracts are often of a long-term nature and 
early termination of contracts involves costs. These high switching costs are prohibitive, so 
consumers are locked-in. (By the way, this holds also for the financial institutions). Switching 
costs are also high for payment accounts (in terms of the effort required), where automatic 
payment and collection services are linked to a unique account number. Here, the switching costs 
are not prohibitively high. 
 
Search costs for financial products are high as these products are often complicated or seen as 
such. The financial market is opaque in the sense that prices and quality are often difficult to 
observe or assess. Search cost could be alleviated if search could be entrusted to specialist agents. 
However, the flip side from this extra link in the supply chain is that is goes with additional costs. 
Advice would help consumers (and producers) to avoid errors in their product and brand choice. 
Moreover, it would make the market more competitive by increasing the elasticity of demand. 
Thus, it is very desirable to have a well-functioning market for financial advice. However, 
financial advice markets often function improperly. In particular, under less efficient incentive 
structures in these markets (notably commissions) and with inexperienced consumers, insurance 
agents may give advice that is not in the best interest of consumers.
3  
 
                                                 
3 Research in the Netherlands shows that the effect of advice may turn out to be negative: the clients that 
bought a policy through an insurance advisor received, on average, a significantly lower pay-out than the 
respondents that bought a policy directly from an insurer. Further, intermediaries appeared to deteriorate 
the (initial) choice of consumers with respect to risk taking, probably because commissions are highest for 
high risk products, so that their added value is negative (CPB, 2005, Chapter 5). New regulation requires 
intermediaries to disclose their commission or income and their dependency on financial institutions.   7 
Consumer power weakens as a market becomes less transparent. Strong brand names are 
indicators of non-transparency, as confidence in a well-known brand may replace price 
comparisons or personal judgment.
4 The power of consumers also depends on their financial 
literacy. On average, financial literacy is rather low, also among the high educated. This has been 
documented particularly for pension services (Van Rooij et al., 2007). Financial illiteracy 
increases the dependency of consumers on the (weak) intermediation sector. Another indicator is 
the degree to which buyers organize themselves, for instance to be informed and to reduce the 
opaque nature of the market. Consumer organizations, Internet sites and financial magazines, 
compare prices and inform consumers continuously on financial product conditions and prices in 
order to enable them to make comparisons and well-founded choices. Consumer (and 
commercial) organizations reduce market opacity, but they are unable to overcome all problems, 
because products are inherently complicated and come in a wide range of different properties. 
Besides, many consumers are not able or not willing to make the effort to search for the best 
offer. A third indicator is the degree to which consumers can take out financial products 
collectively. Collective contracts are usually based on thorough comparisons of conditions and 
prices by experts, are often negotiated via the employer and contribute substantially to consumer 
power.
5 There are examples of how in the US 401(k) plans offered by large employers carry 
lower costs. Of course, many people are unable to add to their consumer power this way. 
Particularly for banking products such collective contracts are rare.  
 
Abundant examples exist of poorly functioning consumer markets. We name a few current 
examples in the Netherlands: interest rates on simple saving accounts vary between 1.25% and 
3.5%, due to consumers’ loyalty, ignorance, or apathy, and to smart strategies of the banks,
6 
similar large spreads in prices of annuities and life insurances,
7 high cost margins (of around 
40%) in life insurance types of saving products. Similarly, regarding failing international 
competition, we observe large differences in interest rate on deposits across countries, annual 
costs of payments accounts varying within in the EU from € 34 to € 252 (Cap Gemini, 2005), and 
so on. 
 
                                                 
4 Strong effects of brands names may also reflect a good functioning reputation mechanism. However, we 
observe that bank ‘use’ their brand names, for instance, by offering low deposit rates. 
5 In the Netherlands, health cost insurance arrangements are often offered by employers or social 
organizations. Of course, the employees’ pension plan is the best example of a collectively offered financial 
product. 
6 For instance, the regular introduction of new types of account, while lowering the interest rates on older 
accounts of mainly immobile clients.  
7 In the Netherlands, the guaranteed pay-out a life insurances with the same premium may vary across 
insurers by a factor of 1.5 (CPB, 2005, Chapter 5).   8 
Most problems faced by consumers are also affecting SMEs. However, their position may be 
even more unfavourable, as they usually depend on a few local banks only, due to information 
asymmetries. Incidentally, dependency on local banks can also have benefits.
8 Boot (2007) 
recommends introduction of legislation and regulation to support existence of credit registries 
with fine-grained information about SME clients to make them more attractive to a potential new 
bank. The position of wholesale firms is more difficult to assess. Of course, for traditional 
banking products, the wholesale firms are well equipped to assess the prices and quality of 
banking services. However, we observe a continuous shift over time from traditional 
intermediation to new, more sophisticated and complex products whose prices and quality are 
more difficult to assess. Examples are merger and take-over services the equity and bond issuance 
management, and the construction of complex investment products such as SPVs and SIVs. 
Furthermore, the price and quality of many wholesale banking services are subject to tailor-made 
contracts and therefore less public. Consequently, price competition in these new banking service 
markets is presumably more limited than in traditional intermediation.  
 
Thus on the supply side, we observe a certain degree of supplier power, due in particular to the 
existence of informal entry barriers and strong product differentiation, where in the case of 
limited numbers of suppliers the risk of (tacit) collusion may increase. On the demand side we 
find factors such as high search and switching costs, few substitution possibilities, limited 
consumer power due to the opaque nature of financial products and financial illiteracy of 
consumers. Furthermore, the booming markets of complex, tailor-made wholesale banking 
services are also opaque.  
 
All in all, we observe a number of conditions that make some kind of oligopoly or monopolistic 
competition on financial markets more likely than perfect competition. It should be kept in mind 
that impediments to perfect competition may simply result from, given existing trade-offs with 
stability, innovations and access to financial services. Regulation of competitive authorities may 
be needed to improve these conditions and reduce their possible adverse effects on competition, 
thereby aiming at heavier competition, not necessary at perfect competition. 
 
                                                 
8 Benefits from having local banks could come from relationship lending, where the banks are more willing 
to acquire information on the borrower.   9 
3  Possible policy reaction to financial market failures 
 
The analysis above points to many factors, which contribute to financial market failures. Some of 
them have already been discussed by Claessens (2008), e.g. removal of entry barriers.
9 Here, we 
briefly discuss some possibilities to remove other obstacles to competition.  
 
Competition is generally seen as crucial in order to obtain low prices, high quality, efficiency, 
innovation, easy access for all potential clients, effective monetary policy,
10 financial stability, 
and so on. Nevertheless, there may be submarkets where, given the underlying market conditions, 
strong (let alone full) competition cannot produce welfare gains. An example is the market for 
pensions. The Netherlands has an extensive capital based collective pension system, which is 
mandatory for (almost) all employees. The employer and the labour unions choose a company-
specific or industry-wide pension fund,
11 an insurer or (in the near future) a so-called General 
Pension Institution to perform the agreed pension scheme.
12 Although this choice creates a certain 
degree of competition between pension funds and insurers, competition is limited in the sense that 
individual employees have no choice at all. The alternative is a free market for pension 
provisions, where we need to distinguish between freedom with respect to savings (free versus 
mandatory) and freedom with respect to the way the savings are managed (fund’s choice versus 
employee’s own choice). In countries where mandatory savings are (often) absent, as in the UK 
and the US, consumers frequently appear unable to save adequately for their old age. For 
instance, Chile and the Netherlands have some mandatory savings components, but management 
in Chile takes place on a competitive, individual basis, whereas in Netherlands it is collective. 
However, ‘commercial’ pension funds and insurers need to lay out high costs to acquire clients, 
have to deal with adverse selection and with expenses to diminish its adverse effects, and (with 
respect to insurers) the need to make a profit.
13 In the Netherlands, the operational costs of free-
market voluntary pension provisions, the only tax-friendly option open to the self-employed, are 
estimated to be seven times those of obligatory employee pension funds (Bikker and De Dreu, 
2007).
14 The operational costs of Dutch pension funds are among the lowest world-wide (Bikker 
and De Dreu, 2009). Most Dutch employers appear to be quite happy about not having to choose 
                                                 
9 Boot (2007) recommends regulators and governments to ensure that costs of essential memberships 
(credit bureaus, banking associations and payment systems), regulatory reporting, and minimum capital 
requirements are not disproportionate to the size of new institutions. 
10 More competition lowers bank interest rate spreads on policy and market rates and increases the speed of 
adjustment after changes in the latter rates (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2008). 
11 In the Netherlands, unless an industry-wide pension fund is mandatory under the sector’s Collective 
Labour Agreement. 
12 Or, due to coming EU regulation, a foreign pension fund (NMa, 2006). 
13 Many of these arguments also apply to a lot of non-financial markets. Stimulation of pension savings 
may be the dominant reason for the authorities to act more paternalistic on the pension market.  
14 Different institutional conditions and regulatory regimes across types of voluntary pension providers also 
play a role.   10 
(Van Rooij et al., 2007). Of course, this is a very specific situation, where many issues may raise 
further discussion. More generally, in the presence of information asymmetries, agency issues 
and so forth, competition is likely to be imperfect and may lead to perverse results. Hence, for 
some particular financial submarkets, we should not aim at competition but only at efficiency. 
 
Using our diagnostic framework, we observed that financial illiteracy is one of the major causes 
of weak consumer power. Providing financial education may relieve the problem and enhance 
competition. A range of academic articles evaluate the results and indicate what kind of 
programmes are effective (e.g. Bernheim and Garrett, 1996; Lusardi, 2004; Mooslechner et al., 
2003; Braunstein and Welch, 2002). Programmes should particularly focus on knowledge and 
information, sense of urgency and self-confidence. It seems likely that only a part of the 
population is susceptible to such efforts. Further development of price comparison websites may 




Heterogeneity is another structural weakness that can be addressed. A possible step forward is to 
promote more homogeneous or standardised products. A good example has set by the FSA in the 
UK, which a few years ago provided a detailed definition of a normalized private pension plan. 
Further, they opened and maintain a website with prices of the financial institutions which offered 
such prescribed pension products. These products are included only after a thorough examination 
to check whether they meet the standards. This approach helps to solve the heterogeneity problem 
and to avoid the exploitation of semi-monopolistic power. Similarly, in the Netherlands, a basis 
package for health care insurance has been defined (so standardized) which is a precondition for 
government support (NMa, 2006).
16 This standardized product enables competition, also where 
health insurance policies are complicated and many consumers are not well-informed or willing 
to investigate the various offers.  
 
Payment systems typically face serious network property problems. National cooperation has 
increased efficiency significantly, but at the cost of impairing competition. In the EU, the Single 
European Payment Area (SEPA) framework, in effect since January 25, 2008, aims at the 
introduction of several competing, cross-border payment systems, which may benefit from the 
large, euro area-wide scale (NMa, 2006; Boot, 2007). The problem of the high costs involved in 
switching one’s payment account over to another bank can be solved if bank clients are allowed 
to transfer their unique payment account number, including the linked automatic payment and 
                                                 
15 A problem is further that it remains difficult to compare complex conditions of financial products.  
16 Around 50% of the cost is covered by a particular income dependent tax, levied by the government. 
Insurers may also offer supplementary packages.    11 
collection services, to any other bank. Of course this would require large IT investments for 
banks and international coordination to enable cross-border transmission.  
 
Price competition on new tailor-made and complex wholesale banking services is likely to be 
more limited than in traditional intermediation. The prices and quality of such services are much 
more opaque than those of standardized consumer services. This problem creates a major 
challenge for, among others, competitive authorities, particularly as these new products 
increasingly dominate the income of (large) banks.  
 
In the banking market, the regulatory regime of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(Basel I and II) aims at creating an international level playing field by establishing minimum 
capital requirements which are identical for internationally operating banks across all joining 
countries, enabling fair cross-border competition. Similarly, international supervisory regimes for 
the insurance industries and pension funds would greatly encourage cross-border competition in 
those sectors. In the EU, Solvency II is under development for insurance firms, leaving still room 
for a world-wide regime. Further, functionally equivalent products should have similar 




In many consumer markets intermediary agencies are important in providing support to 
financially illiterate clients. In order to avoid conflicts of interest such agencies need to be 
independent from financial institutions and their fee structure needs to be transparent to their 
clients. Such independence would be best served by a fixed hourly rate to be paid by the client. In 
practice, however, consumers are generally less rational and dislike paying for such independent 
advice. They prefer receiving ‘free’ advice from financial institutions or intermediaries where, of 
course, similar costs are hidden in product prices while the advice may be less in line with their 
own preferences. Such irrational behaviour hampers the disciplinary power from the demand side, 
which is a sound condition for competition.   
 
Although many financial market failures are difficult to solve, the discussion above explains that 
there are many – general and specific – possible steps in the right direction, which would help to 
foster competition. 
 
                                                 
17 This is far from simple. For instance, a long-term mortgage may increase the interest rate risk of a bank 
(having a low duration), while it generally reduces the interest rate risk of an insurance firm (having a high 
duration).    12 
4  How to measure competition 
 
Given the trade-off that competition in the financial markets should be strong enough to support 
welfare and economic development, but that competition should not be too high so that it may 
threaten financial stability, innovation and unhindered access to credit, an optimal level of 
competition exists. In order to be able to judge the current level and to compare that with the (not 
necessarily known) optimal level, we need to measure competition. Though competition is a clear 
concept in economic theory, we need a precise definition, if we want to measure it. The 
dictionary explains competition as “the effort of two or more parties acting independently to 
secure the business of a third party by offering the most favourable terms”, “active demand by 
two or more organisms or kinds of organisms for some environmental resource in short supply” 
and “a contest between rivals”. While precise enough in themselves, these definitions offer no 
clues on how to measure competition. 
 
In many economic theories, competition is related to the (relative) size of a mark-up on the cost 
price as a component of the output price. However, data on the price-cost margin (PCM) are 
generally not available in the financial markets. Whereas prices are observable on a number of 
banking or insurance submarkets, one seldom finds data on the cost prices of individual products. 
Therefore, we have to measure competition indirectly. Many measurement approaches are closely 
linked to the PCM.
18 Bikker and Bos (2005, 2008) derive a formula for the equilibrium PCM 
from a general framework of a profit maximizing bank under oligopoly behaviour: 
 
PCM = HHI × PED × (1+CV)  (1) 
 
where HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration (that weights banks’ market 
shares with their own market shares), PED the price (or interest) elasticity of demand and CV the 
conjectural variation, that is, the bank’s expectations about the reactions of its rivals in terms of 
output quantities or prices.
19 Particularly the conjectural variation is difficult to observe. 
 
Competition has often been proxied by simple measures, both in theory and in practice. Examples 
of proxies are: the number of banks, the HHI, the interest rate margin and efficiency measures 
such as the cost-income ratio. Although some proxies could bear a certain relationship to the 
PCM (e.g. the interest rate margin) or to components of it (HHI), others are only vaguely 
                                                 
18 Although such PCM is a plausible measure, in practice, this definition has also its shortcomings (Boone 
et al., 2007). 
19 Under certain conditions, conjectural variation is zero under perfect competition and 1 under monopoly 
or a perfect cartel.    13 
connected. Therefore, we prefer model-based measures that are closer in line with Equation (1). 
The literature provides a number of such measures, such as Panzar and Rosse (1987), Bresnahan 
(1989) and Boone et al. (2007),
20 which while derived from Equation (1), are based on different 
simplifying assumptions (Bikker and Bos, 2005, 2008). This is one of the reasons why different 
measures may produce divergent estimates of competition. 
 
The literature provides a large number of empirical studies on banking competition. The number 
of publications on measuring insurance competition is very small, due to limited data availability. 
A few examples are Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2008), who use the Boone indicator for life 
insurance firms, Bikker and Gorter (2008), who study scale economies of non-life insurers, and 
Bikker, Spierdijk and Miro (2009), who apply the P-R model to the non-life insurance industry.  
 
This paper gives a survey of measures of competition of over 100 countries based on the Panzar-
Rosse (P-R) model. This model has a sound theoretical basis, uses data which are readily 
available
21 (so that the model can be applied to many countries) and has been applied 
frequently.
22 This approach measures how total interest revenues of banks in a country or market 
react to changes in input prices. A firm’s competitive behaviour in the market is reflected by the 
degree by which input price changes are passed through to output prices and to changes in output 
volume. The P-R model produces a certain H-statistic which under certain conditions reflects the 
degree of competition with H=1 pointing to perfect competition and H≤0 indicating monopoly or 
a perfect cartel. The range 0<H<1 denotes monopolistic competition or oligopoly of some sort. 
Hereby, this P-R approach defines ‘competition’ as a certain competitive behaviour, measured as 
an average over all banking products. For each country, one H value has been estimated.  
 
5  Empirical results for banks 
 
Bikker et al. (2006a) use the P-R model to provide H values for 101 countries over 1986-2004, 
based on 25,000 banks, see Table A.1 and Charts A.1 and A.2 in the appendix.
23 Chart A.1 
present the estimation results of H in alphabetical order of the respective country names and 
Table A.2 arranges the estimates from low to high values of H. The world-wide average value if 
                                                 
20 See also Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2008) and Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2008). 
21 Required data include observations on input prices. Commonly they are unavailable so that proxies are 
used. 
22 A drawback may be that the P-R approach considers the total banking output as one single product, so 
that it ignores the existence of many products, and hence of many submarkets, with own levels of 
competitive pressure. However, the required data to measure competition of single products are hardly ever 
available. 
23 The charts include only the 80 countries where equilibrium has been observed, a prerequisite for a 
reliable competition measure. H is the sum of the input price elasticities in the P-R revenue equation.   14 
H is 0.50. Chart A.2 shows that the level of competition varies strongly across countries. Around 
30% of the countries have values of H that correspond to monopoly (H is zero or negative) or are 
close to those values (left part of the chart). Formal testing reveals that monopoly cannot be 
rejected for 29 countries. Further, this chart shows that around one-third of the countries have H 
values, corresponding with (near-) perfect competition (H=1; right part of Chart A.2). The formal 
tests cannot reject perfect competition in 39 countries. At the same time, monopolistic 
competition cannot be rejected in all countries but one. This divides the countries in three groups 
with low, medium and high competition. It should be kept in mind that these competition 
estimates apply to all of a country’s banking activities. Competition on sub-markets (individual 
product, local areas) may deviate from this overall picture.  
 
Chart 1 gives averages of H for each continent. Remarkably, we do not observe any systematic 
difference between developed and developing countries. The figures are all around the average of 
0.50. Banking competition in the Middle East appears to lag somewhat behind the rest of the 
world, whereas, in terms of competition, banks in South America are leading the other continents.  
 






6 Explaining  banking  competition 
 
What are the main factors that determine the level of competition? This is an important question, 
particularly with a view to the development of an optimal competition policy and policy 
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recommendations. The survey of Claessens (2008) and the discussion on the structure of the 
financial factors above provide many potential drivers of competition. However, many of these 
factors are not directly observable. Traditionally, the market structure – generally measured by 
the number of banks, banking concentration or average bank size – takes a pivotal position in 
explaining competition. Other theories focus on the impact of new entrants or on the 
contestability caused by potential (new) entrants, the efficiency of banks and the influence of the 
business cycle. A number of empirical studies
24 assess the impact of other determinants on 
banking competition, such as measures of interindustry competition, indicators of contestability 
(e.g. actual foreign entrants and barriers to entry such as tighter entry and activity restrictions) 
and aspects of countries’ overall institutional framework (e.g. regulatory and supervisory 
practices, entry restrictions, and barriers to foreign investment).  
 
The seminal study of Claessens and Laeven (2004) is the first extensive investigation into the 
factors that drive competition, based on the P-R model as the measure of competition. The 
approach includes two steps. First, they estimate H as measure of competition for 39 countries 
using data from the 1994-2001 period. Second, they explain H by several sets of competition 
drivers. The number of countries in this second step varies from 22 to 39 countries. Bikker et al. 
(2007) extend their study by assessing the determinants of banking competition for a much larger 
set of countries (76 in total), using data from the 1995-2004 period. They apply a wide range of 
tests to assess the robustness of their approach, so as to ensure that their results do not depend on 
subjective choices regarding their model specification. The following summarises their study. 
The first step is the estimation of H, as presented above and as reported in Table A.1. The second 
step is explaining these H-values, using the potential determinants introduced below. 
 
Potential determinants of competition 
To explain banking competition, Bikker et al. (2007) consider a number of potential determinants 
of competition. These variables have been predicted to affect competition in the theoretical 
literature or have been used in one or more of a number of other empirical cross-country studies 
that analyse the performance and competitiveness of the banking system. They consider five 
types of factors: variables with respect to market structure, contestability, inter-industry 
competition, institutions en macro-economic conditions. 
 
1. Market structure variables 
Traditionally, the market structure was considered as a major determinant of competition. 
                                                 
24 Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), Maudos and Nagore (2005), Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005), Carbó 
Valverde and Rodríguez Fernández (2006) and Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2007), using the Lerner 
index, and Bikker and Haaf (2002a) and Claessens and Laeven (2004), using the P-R model.   16 
•  Bank concentration ratios. The five-bank concentration ratio (CR5) as a first measure of 
banking market concentration, defined as the total market share of the five largest banks in a 
particular country, based on total assets. As an alternative concentration ratio, the HHI has 
been considered.  
•  Number of banks. The above concentration indices show a strong negative correlation with 
the number of banks, due to a well-known weakness of concentration indices, namely their 
dependence on the size of a country or banking market. This shortcoming has been dealt with 
by taking the number of banks into account as well as an explanatory variable.
25 The number 
of banks itself is also a commonly used variable to describe the market structure. 
•  Foreign ownership of banks. This is a measure of the degree of foreign ownership of banks 
calculated as the fraction of the banking system's assets that is in banks that are 50% or more 
foreign owned. It takes into account the fact that foreign banks may behave differently from 
domestic banks. 
 
2. Contestability variables 
Since the contestability theory predicts a direct relation between entrance barriers and the 
competitiveness of the banking industry, variables measuring contestability of the banking sector 
have been included.  
•  (Cross-sector) activity restrictions. An activity restrictions variable has been included that 
measures the banks’ ability to engage in the businesses of underwriting, insurance and real 
estate, as well as the regulatory permission for banks to own shares in non-financial firms. A 
higher value of the activity restrictions variable indicates that more restrictions are imposed 
on cross-sector activities in the financial industry.  
•  Restrictions on foreign investments. The more restrictions exist on such investments, the 
higher the score of this index will be.  
 
3. Inter-industry variables 
Possible competitive pressure banks face from other sectors are also included. 
•  Capital markets. This variable reflects the country’s stock market capitalization as a fraction 
of GDP.  
•  Insurance firms. The annual volume of life insurance premiums as a fraction of GDP is a 
proxy for the competition coming from the non-banking part of the financial sector, assuming 
                                                 
25 Another reason to include the number of banks is that the concentration ratio is a one-dimensional 
measure taking account of two dimensions: the number of banks (reflecting the density of the banking 
market) and their size distribution (reflecting skewness). By including, for example, both the HHI and the 
number of banks as explanatory variables in the regression model, this two-dimensionality has been 
restored (see Bikker and Haaf, 2002b).   17 
that life insurance premiums not only reflect the demand for life insurance products but also 
for more sophisticated financial services in general. 
 
4. Institutional variables 
To account for national institutional differences, three indices are included that relate to economic 
freedom in the style of the ‘laissez-faire’ model.  
•  Property rights index. This index includes ten indicators of property rights. The lower the 
score of this index is, the better is the protection of property rights. 
•  Regulation index. The higher the score of this index is, the tighter are the regulations on 
investments and on starting up a business.  
•  Banking freedom. The higher the score of this index is, the less banking freedom exists.  
•  EU dummy. To account for EU-specific effects not captured by the other determinants, a 
dummy variable for the EU-15 countries has been included.  
•  Socialist history dummy. A dummy for countries with a socialist history (e.g. the previously 
centrally planned economies in Eastern and Central European countries that constituted the 
Warsaw Pact and the republics of the Soviet Union) takes account of the fact that banks in 
these countries are expected to be affected by economic and institutional conditions 
prevailing in earlier decades.  
 
5. Macro-economic conditions 
Also, differences in the countries’ general economic development are considered. 
•  GDP per capita. This variable has been used as proxy for economic and financial 
development.  
•  Real annual GDP growth. The annual GDP growth (or GDP in deviation from its trend) can 
be taken as a proxy for the business cycle. The pattern in the H-statistic may be affected by 
the response of banks to business cycle dynamics. 
•  Inflation rate. This variable has been based on the GDP deflator.  
 
Data on these variables for 2004 could be obtained for 76 countries, so that the explanation of 
competition (measured by H) is restricted to these countries. Exceptions are the ‘foreign 
ownership of banks’ and ‘insurance firms’ variables, each of which would, if included, reduce the 
sample by ten countries. They are added to the sample in only two variants. After testing on 
multicollinearity,
26 five determinants are excluded (HHI, number of banks, property rights index, 
banking freedom, and inflation rate), so that a smaller set of drivers of competition remains, see 
Table 2. 
                                                 
26 That is, the phenomenon that two variables reflect roughly the same property.   18 
 
A remarkable result is that the dominant determinant in the theoretical literature, banking market 
concentration, does not have a significant impact on competition. The traditional literature 
suggests that market concentration impairs competition (assuming a static relationship), whereas 
a more modern and dynamic interpretation of this variable is that competition may force banks to 
consolidate, so that competitive banks end up in a concentrated market. However, no evidence 
has been found for either of these theories, perhaps because opposite effects cancel each other 
out. This outcome also holds for other concentration variables such as the HHI and the number of 
banks. This result confirms the respective findings of Claessens and Laeven (2004).  
 
Table 2   Explaining competition in 76 countries (2004) 
Variables 
a   Coefficient t-value  SPC 
b 
1. Bank concentration CR5  -0.001 -0.8  0.009
2. Activity restrictions  -0.000 -0.7  0.007
3. Ln (Market cap./GDP)  -0.016 -0.4  0.002
4. Foreign investment index  -0.132 -3.2  0.133
    Regulation index  0.128 2.5  0.084
    EU-15 -0.129 -1.4  0.029
   Socialist legal history  -0.435 -5.6  0.320
5. Ln (GDP per cap)  0.011 0.3  0.001
    Real growth GDP  -0.023 -2.8  0.109
Sum   0.694
Adjusted R
2 0.82  
Number of countries  76  
a The variables are defined in the text; 
b SPC stands for squared partial correlation and reflects the contribution of the 
respective explanatory variable to the variation in the level of competition or, in short, the economic effect.  
 
Also a next market structure variable, foreign ownership, does not play a significant role (as 
Table 2 shows), though in contrast to Claessens and Laeven (2004), where this variable turned 
out significant. Of course, where the effect is absent for the entire sample, it may be present in a 
number of countries, particularly where foreigners bring in different competitive behaviour. All in 
all, none of the selected market structure variables seem to play a significant role as determinants 
of competition.  
 
As expected, contestability does play an important role as a determinant of competition. The more 
attractive a country’s investment climate is for outsiders, the more competitive its banking sector 
will be. Apparently, the possibility of foreign investors entering the country adds to the 
competitive pressure. Although activity restrictions are not significant in the full-sample estimates 
reported in Table 2, they do play a significant role in more restricted analyses where only large 
banks are included. Apparently, competition among large banks, in particular, is likely to suffer 
from cross-sector activity restrictions, presumably because otherwise they would be quicker to 
enter the insurance market than smaller banks.   19 
 
Neither of the two inter-industry variables appears to be significant. Conversely a country's 
institutional framework is a major determinant of banking competition. Extensive regulation, 
particularly antitrust policies (it may be assumed), improves the competitive environment 
significantly, of course, fully in line with expectations. Competition is substantially weaker in 
countries with a socialist history, e.g. in Eastern and Central Europe. Apparently, in terms of 
banking competition, the transition towards a market economy has not been fully completed 
there. 
 
Finally, collusion mark-ups of banks are significantly cyclical in the sense that they follow the 
movements in GDP growth rate that act as a proxy for the business cycle. Evidently, competitive 
pressures weaken when the economy booms.  
  
The last column of Table 2 shows how important the determinants are in explaining competition. 
A socialist history is by far the dominant factor, followed by foreign investment restrictions, the 
business cycle and the regulation index. Bikker et al. (2007) apply a large number of robustness 
tests to examine how stable the results are: replacing HHI and number of banks for CR5, adding 
one or two extra explanatory variables (foreign ownership and life insurance sector size, thereby 
reducing the sample size), estimating with OLS instead of WLS, applying 2SLS (as market 
structure variables might be endogenous) and, finally, requiring a higher minimum number of 
banks per country. All results are similar so that the conclusions remain unaffected. The analyses 
are also repeated for large and small banks, respectively. Here, activity restrictions become 
significant for large banks, a mentioned above. Further, the EU dummy becomes significant, 
probably due to the larger share of more developed sophisticated banking products, a submarket 
where competition is weaker. 
 
The policy recommendations from this paper are straightforward:  
•   more regulation reducing competitive obstacles 
•   no obstacles for foreign investment 
•   reduce cross-sector restrictions 
Although this advice seems quite obvious, one should keep in mind that in the current situation, 
the differences across countries are that large that they explain no less than 82% of differences in 
competitive pressure across countries (see R
2 in Table 2). According to our interpretation of the 
results, they contain a warning. Developments of new, sophisticated products may reduce 
competition, due to their opaque nature. If this would hold true, more regulation or competition 
policy is required. 
   20 
7 Impact  of  consolidation 
 
One of the most prominent developments in the banking industry has been the strong worldwide 
consolidation observed during the past decades. This is reflected by a sharp fall in the number of 
banks, increased concentration, and the grown size of the largest (five) banks both in absolute 
terms and relative to the smaller banks. Table A.2 in the appendix illustrates these developments 
for the major economies during 1990-2005. The changes in market structure raise the question 
how and to what extent competition is affected by the expansion of the largest banks. Several 
studies predict a positive relation between bank size and market power, which they contribute to, 
for instance, the more dominant position of large banks relative to their smaller competitors.
27 An 
alternative view holds that smaller banks tend to operate primarily on local markets where 
competition is often seen as weaker, whereas larger banks tend to operate more on national and 
international levels, where competition is generally assumed to be stronger due to the pressure 
from foreign banks (see Gilibert and Steinherr, 1989). The latter view is supported by the 
empirical literature based on the P-R model, which establishes a negative relation between bank 
size and market power.
28  
 
With the contradictory results in the theoretical and empirical literature in mind, Bikker et al. 
(2006b) explore a novel approach to assessing the relation between bank size and market power. 
They extend the P-R model by introducing a direct role for bank size, using quantile regression as 
an alternative to splitting up the sample into size classes of large and small banks. For 42 out of 
101 countries they find that competition decreases significantly with bank size, including the 
world’s major economies. These countries cover 85% of all 18.500 banks in their sample. For the 
remaining countries, H is fairly constant over the range from small to large banks, or the number 
of observations in the sample is too low to draw reliable conclusions.
29 The average H value 
corresponding to large banks (90
th quantile) equals 0.42, while the H value of small banks (10
th 




                                                 
27 See e.g. Monti (1972) and Klein (1971), Jappelli (1993), Freixas and Rochet (1997), and Bikker and Bos 
(2005). 
28 For instance, Bikker and Groeneveld (2000), De Bandt and Davis (2000), Bikker and Haaf (2002a), 
Hempell (2002), Bikker (2004), and Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006) all find that bank 
competition increases with bank size. We ascribe this to misspecification (Bikker et al., 2006b). 
29 Costa Rica is the only country for which a substantially positive relation has been established between 
bank size and competition. 
30 Note that this outcome is not quite consistent with the earlier finding that market structure measured by 
concentration ratios did not affect the level of competition. Apparently, the concentration indices do not 
fully reflect the impact of large banks.     21 
Formal testing on the market structure confirms this pattern: monopoly or a perfect cartel in the 
small bank submarket is rejected for only 12 countries, while it is rejected for 32 national 
submarkets with large banks, confirming that large banks operate more often under monopoly. 
Similarly perfect competition is less often rejected for small banks (42 countries) than for large 
banks (28 countries), confirming that small banks operate more often under perfect competition. 
 
Chart 2  Average H statistic as a function of bank size 
 
 
Their findings confirm the theoretical strands of literature that predict a positive relation between 
bank size and market power. At the same time, their outcomes contradict the conventional view 
in the P-R literature that the level of competition increases with bank size. They distinguish two 
possible drivers behind the market power of large banks. The first is that size itself plays a major 
role. Large banks are likely to be in a better position to collude with other banks. Large banks 
may also benefit from their more established reputation. Furthermore, large banks are presumably 
more successful in creating fully or partly new banking products and services than small banks, 
e.g. because of economies of scale in product development. This enables them to exploit their 
monopolistic power, as is common in markets where monopolistic competition is the prevailing 
market structure. This outcome implies that small firms face high thresholds when they try to 
enter the banking market. 
 
The second explanation is that large banks tend to operate partly on different product submarkets 
(more wholesale than retail) and geographical submarkets (more international than local). The   22 
wholesale market is characterized by tailor-made products and services supplied by only a limited 
number of large banks, which enables them to exert a degree of monopolistic power. 
 
The world-wide trend towards consolidation combined with this observation of more market 
power for larger banks increases the need for appropriate antitrust policies on the affected 
submarkets. 
 
8  Changes over time  
 
Over the past decades, both new developments in information technology and continued 
liberalization and harmonization of the financial markets have strongly affected the financial 
environment in which banks operate. Developments in ICT have changed banks’ production 
technologies, products and distribution strategies, as well as size of financial markets. The Second 
Banking Coordination Directive, as part of the single European market project in 1992, and the 
establishment of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 have removed important 
obstacles to cross-border competition. The creation of large and transparent euro capital markets 
has promoted competition within the European banking world. Advantages in the management of 
equity and debt issuance, investments and mediation for banks in their own national currency 
compared to foreign banks, have been sharply reduced since the euro replaced the respective 
national currencies. Similarly, several changes have drastically altered the banking landscape in 
the United States. For instance the Reigle-Neal Act of 1994, allowing national banks to operate 
branches across state lines as of 1997. Another important change was the 1999 Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, which eliminated the restrictions of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act on affiliations 
between commercial and investment banks and allowed banks to engage in underwriting and 
other dealing activities. These contributions to international integration, together with the entry of 
new types of competitors using the Internet, are likely to have contributed to banks’ 
competitiveness, particularly in the EMU area. The transition from centrally planned economies 
to market economies in Eastern and Central Europe also had a major impact on bank competition 
in that area. Increased competition may force banks to improve their efficiency, on pain of being 
pushed out of the market. 
 
On the other hand, efficiency has also been among the many drivers of the consolidation wave in 
the banking industry observed during the past decades. This prominent development is reflected 
by a sharp fall in the number of banks, by the increased banking concentration, and by the rise in 
the market share of the largest banks. The consolidation process has impaired competition, 
reducing the improvements in competitiveness mentioned above. Informational technology may 
have added to fixed costs in the banking industry, resulting in larger (unused) scale economies,   23 
particularly for smaller banks. Such increased scale economies would contribute further to market 
power and, hence, to a reduction in competition. Other important developments in the banking 
industry are also likely to have affected the competitive developments over time. The continuous 
shift from traditional intermediation to new, more sophisticated and complex products may have 
reduced competition. Price and quality of modern bank services are more opaque and wholesale 
banking often deals in tailor-made products. Consequently, price competition in these markets is 
presumably more limited than in traditional intermediation. Hence, competition may be expected 
to be weaker on the growing non-interest markets.  
 
Given this multitude of major developments with respect to competition, Bikker and Spierdijk 
(2008) investigate whether and how banking competition has changed over time. They apply the 
P-R approach to measure banks’ market power over time in three different ways.  
•  First, explorative yearly and rolling-window estimates of the H statistic for eleven major 
industrial economies and two regions (where sufficient data were available) are obtained to 
assess how the competitive climate changed during the 1989-2004 period.
31 
•  Second, the linear trend in banking competition during the 1986-2004 period has been 
assessed for 101 countries. For the aforementioned eleven countries and two regions enough 
data are available to estimate several parametric models that offer various degrees of 
flexibility to capture possible nonlinear changes in the competitive climate.  
•  Finally, structural breaks in competition over time are detected using econometric tests for 
structural stability. These tests do not impose a priori fixed break dates, but are able to detect 
breaks endogenously. As a robustness check, a wide range of additional macro-economic 
factors are included to ensure that the changes they assess, and the breaks that are detected, 
are genuine and not merely due to e.g. business cycle movements. 
 
Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) establish significant changes in banking competition over time. Chart 
A.3 in the appendix shows graphs of (recursive) annual estimates for eleven major industrial 
economies in two regions. In France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the US 
(after 1998) competition seems to have declined over time. This is particularly clear for the entire 
EU-15. The remaining nations, being Austria, Denmark, Spain, the UK, Japan, and Eastern-
Europe, show a more stable H statistic or a slight increase over time. Particularly, the competition 
in Eastern Europe shows an upward trend. 
 
                                                 
31 Rolling-window or recursive estimates of the H statistic start with estimates of the first few years, 
continue with estimates of the first years, and successively add data of a next year to the sample, using ever 
larger subsets of the data.    24 
Significantly negative trends in competition were found for 39 of the 101 countries, while the 
trend is significantly positive for 22 countries. For the emerging markets in the 101 country 
sample, the average value of the trend coefficient equals 0.007 (i.e. an annual rise in H of 0.7 
percentage points), reflecting that emerging economies are generally in a transition process of 
becoming (slightly) more competitive. The remaining nations have a negative average value of 
the trend coefficient equals to -0.018 (i.e. an annual decline in H of 1.8 percentage points). For 
both the EU-15 and the group of nine Eastern European countries the trend coefficient is 
significantly negative. On average, the changes in competition over time are small. The average 
value of the H statistic ranges from 0.55 at the end of the eighties up to 0.50 in 2004. For the EU-
15, the H statistics drops from 0.87 in 1989 to 0.55 in 2004. In Eastern and Central Europe the H 
statistic has been decreasing over time as well, from 0.61 in 1994 to 0.55 in 2004. Apparently, the 
average levels of competition in Eastern and Western Europe converged over time. 
 
Applying structural break tests to eleven countries and two regions revealed that, with the 
exception of Italy, all countries considered that have joined EMU feature a significant structural 
break in either 2001 or 2002, initiating a period of weaker competition. For the non-EMU 
countries Denmark and the UK there is no significant break, whereas in Switzerland a significant 
break emerges in 1995. For the US a break has been established in 2001, starting a low-
competition period. For Japan a break was found in 2003, which was followed by several years of 
increased competition. The results above are based on the P-R approach. For the last decade, Van 
Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) used a different approach to measure banking competition, namely the 
Boone indicator, but they observed the same significant downward trend in the level of 
competition on the European loan markets.  
 
It seems unlikely that the 2001-2002 breaks and the subsequent decline in banking competition in 
the EMU countries were caused by a lagged response to the establishment of EMU and the 
introduction of the ‘virtual’ (non-cash) euro in 1999. The euro may have played an indirect role, 
due to the change in banking services after its establishment in 1999. The newly created euro 
capital market has boosted corporate capital market financing at the cost of direct bank lending. 
This significant shift did not occur in non-euro countries such as Switzerland, the US and Japan.
32 
In the euro area it has reduced traditional intermediation by banks, whereas it has favoured the 
service of banks relating to equity and debt issuance. We expect that competition on debt issuance 
services, where pricing and quality figure less prominently than reputation, is significantly 
                                                 
32 During the period 1999-2007, the capital market financing of non-financial companies increased by 
400% in the euro area, much faster than bank lending. In the non-euro countries in Europe the change in 
capital market financing varied between -23% (Switzerland) and 150% (Sweden). In the US, Japan and 
Canada the growth was between -10% (Japan) and 70% (Canada).   25 
weaker than in the lending market. The introduction of the euro has significantly reinforced the 
efficiency of corporate capital market funding. At the same time, it may have impaired the 
average competitive pressure among euro area banks through the shift from lending to equity and 
debt issuance.  
 
Further, the predominantly downward trend in competition is attributed to the process of 
consolidation, which generally creates larger banks with more market power (see Bikker et al. 
(2006b)). Another explanation for the decline in competition is the continuous shift over time 
from traditional intermediation towards more sophisticated and complex banking products. Price 
and quality of modern bank services are more opaque and the services themselves are more tailor-
made than those based on traditional intermediation markets. Therefore, modern services are 
likely to give banks an advantage in exploiting their market power. In order to find evidence 
supporting this hypothesis, the P-R model’s H parameter has been allowed to depend on the ratio 
of other income to total income. A significantly negative coefficient for other income as a share 
of total income would be a first indication that more sophisticated and complex products do 
indeed reduce competition. A relative increase in the share of other income appears to reduce 
banking competition in the EU-15. The same effect has been found for seven individual EU-15 
countries, but no evidence occurs for a number of countries outside the EU-15, such as the US, 




The first part of this paper investigates the financial market by analyzing its structure. We observe 
quite a number of potential market failures, on both the supply and the demand side, which may 
tempt financial institutions to exploit market power. Opaqueness hinders the correct perception of 
pricing and quality of (complex) financial services and acts as a major obstacle to fierce 
competition. As the share of traditional bank intermediation in total banking activities is currently 
declining in favour of more complex and tailor-made services, this opaqueness may over time 
gain in importance and reduce competition. Other market failures found are informal entry 
barriers, strong product differentiation, cross-ownership, bank productions’ network properties, 
high search and switching costs, lack of substitution possibilities, insufficient consumer power, 
weak-functioning intermediaries and consumers’ financial illiteracy. Many of these structural 
weaknesses that harm competition are not unique for financial markets, but occur also in many 
service industries.  
 
A number of solutions are provided to make it harder for financial institutions to profit from these 
market failures, including financial education, standardization of financial products,   26 
implementation of the right incentive structures for intermediaries, consumer empowerment et 
cetera. Specific issues are likely to require tailor-made measures. While many of these actions 
will help, they will not suffice to remedy the market weaknesses fully, let alone permanently. 
Some market failures may be impossible to eliminate or even relieve. In some markets, failures 
are better solved by structures without (full) competition. 
 
The second part of this paper deals with measuring and explaining banking competition. 
Although every measurement approach may have its shortcomings, the literature provides a 
number of useful methods. We report results for 101 countries based on the Panzar-Rosse 
approach. Competition appears to vary strongly across countries, as for a third part of the 
countries we cannot reject monopoly or a perfect cartel, while for another third part we cannot 
reject perfect competition. Monopolistic competition applies to almost all countries. We do not 
observe differences across continents. On average, the value of our measure of competition, H, 
equals 0.5, exactly half-way between monopoly and perfect competition. This outcome indicates 
that, for most countries, the observed structural market failures did not kept financial institutions 
from behaving competitively. Of course, our measurement concerns the entire banking business: 
competition may still vary strongly across submarkets. In any case, there remains ample room for 
the further enhancement of competition.   
 
The wide range in competitive levels across countries raises the question what determinants are 
responsible for these differences. Explaining the measured competition by a large set of potential 
determinants reveals that competition in many countries would be higher with: (i) more (anti-
trust) regulation, (ii) fewer obstacles to foreign investment, and (iii) fewer cross-sector 
restrictions (particularly for larger banks). Further, mark-ups of banks on cost prices appear to be 
significantly cyclical in the sense that they follow the movements of the business cycle, measured 
as GDP growth. Finally, a socialist legal history, also counts as transition appears not to be 
completed yet. These factors determine 82% of the differences in competition across countries. A 
remarkable outcome is that traditional market structure variables, such as concentration and 
number of banks, seem to have no impact at all. These outcomes provide clear guidance for 
competitive policy: more strength for anti-trust regulation, free entry of foreign investment and 
abolishment of cross-sector obstacles. 
 
One of the major trends in the financial markets is consolidation. For banking, there is evidence 
that in the major industrial economies larger banks have more market power than smaller ones. 
Size itself plays a major role, as large banks are likely to be in a better position to collude with 
other banks and may benefit from their more firmly established reputation. Further, large banks 
are presumably more successful than small banks in creating innovative banking products and   27 
services, for instance, because economies of scale in product development enable them to exploit 
their monopolistic power. A second explanation is that large banks tend to operate partly on 
different product submarkets (more wholesale than retail) and geographical submarkets (more 
international than local). The wholesale market is characterized by tailor-made products and 
services supplied by only a limited number of large banks, which enables them to exert a degree 
of monopolistic power. 
 
Despite ongoing liberalisation, harmonization, internationalisation, financial integration and IT 
developments, we observe a downward trend in competition in many major economies. 
Apparently, in recent years other factors have dominated actual competitive conditions. Possible 
drivers may be consolidation, given large banks’ increasing use of market power, and the relative 
decline in traditional intermediation, in favour of complex, tailor-made banking services, for 
consumers and, especially, wholesale customers. No simple remedies to counter these 
developments seem to offer themselves. For the coming years, these trends present a challenge to 
financial market regulators.  
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APPENDIX  
 








  H value (Bikker 













H value (Claessens 
and Laeven, 2004) 
f 
Algeria     0.25  Mon/PC        
Andorra     0.89  PC  Incr       
Argentina X    0.41    Incr      0.73 
Armenia     0.51           
Australia  X    0.56  PC        0.80 
Austria     0.07  Mon  Decr  Y    0.66 
Azerbaijan     0.11  Mon  Decr       
Bahamas     0.53           
Bahrain     0.52  Mon/PC Decr       
Bangladesh     0.98  PC  Decr  Y    0.69 
Belgium     0.49    Decr  Y    0.73 
Bermuda     0.76    Decr       
Bolivia     0.99  PC         
Botswana     0.08  Mon  Incr       
Brazil X    0.32    Incr      0.83 
Canada X    -0.11  Mon  Decr      0.67 
Cayman Islands      0.59  Mon/PC        
Chile     0.95  PC  Incr      0.66 
China PR  X    1.57           
Colombia     0.56  PC  Incr      0.66 
Costa Rica      1.08  PC    N    0.92 
Croatia     0.44    Decr  Y     
Cyprus     -0.11  Mon  Decr  Y     
Czech Republic      0.77  PC  Incr      0.73 
Denmark     0.33      Y    0.50 
Dominican Republic      0.71  PC  Decr      0.72 
Ecuador   x 0.63 Mon/PC x   x   x 0.68 
El Salvador      0.41    Decr       
Estonia     0.45  Mon/PC        
Finland     -0.27  Mon    Y     
France X    0.60    Decr  Y    0.69 
Germany X    0.65    Decr  Y    0.58 
Ghana     0.65  PC    Y     
Greece     0.51      Y    0.76 
Hong Kong      0.00  Mon        0.70 
Honduras     –          0.81 
Hungary     0.17  Mon  Incr      0.75 
Iceland     -0.14  Mon/PC Incr  Y     
India X    0.48      Y    0.53 
Indonesia X    0.07  Mon  Decr  Y    0.62 
Ireland     1.11  PC  Decr       
Israel     0.12  Mon  Incr  Y     
Italy X    0.09  Mon    Y    0.60 
Ivory Coast      0.39          0.56 
Japan X    0.50    Incr  Y    0.47 
Jordan     0.27    Decr  Y     
Kazakhstan     0.25  Mon  Decr       
Kenya     0.79  PC  Incr  Y    0.58 
Korea, South  X    0.51  Mon/PC Decr       
Kuwait     0.70  PC  Decr       
Latvia     0.57      Y    0.66 
Lebanon     0.44    Incr  Y     
Liechtenstein     0.71  PC  Decr         32 
Lithuania     0.45  Mon/PC        
Luxembourg     0.31    Incr  Y    0.82 
Macau     0.37    Decr  Y     
Macedonia     1.08  PC         
Malaysia     0.73    Decr  Y    0.68 
Malta     -0.22  Mon  Incr       
Mauritius     0.58  PC         
Mexico X    0.85  PC        0.78 
Moldova     0.64    Incr       
Monaco     0.38      Y     
Morocco     0.20  Mon  Decr       
Mozambique     0.52  PC         
Nepal     0.59  PC         
Netherlands     0.78  PC    Y    0.86 
New Zealand      0.35  Mon  Decr  Y     
Nigeria     0.68    Incr  Y    0.67 
Norway     0.47      Y    0.57 
Oman     0.39           
Pakistan     0.47      Y    0.48 
Panama     0.58          0.74 
Paraguay     0.62    Incr  Y    0.60 
Peru     0.63    Incr  Y    0.72 
Philippines     0.66    Decr      0.66 
Poland     0.08  Mon  Decr  Y    0.77 
Portugal     -0.15  Mon    Y    0.67 
Romania     0.64  PC    Y     
Russian Federation  X    0.40          0.54 
Saudi Arabia  X    0.47    Decr       
Senegal     1.06  PC  Decr       
Singapore     0.33  Mon/PC        
Slovakia     0.27    Decr  Y     
Slovenia     0.38    Decr       
South Africa  X    0.88  Mon/PC    Y    0.85 
Spain     0.87  PC  Decr      0.53 
Sri Lanka      0.69  PC  Decr       
Sweden     0.44    Decr       
Switzerland     0.86  PC  Decr      0.67 
Taiwan     0.93  PC  Incr       
Thailand     0.52    Decr       
Trinidad & Tobago      0.08  Mon  Decr  Y     
Turkey X    0.38  Mon/PC Incr  Y    0.46 
Ukraine     0.47          0.68 
United Arab Emirates      0.46    Decr       
United Kingdom  X    0.77  PC  Decr  Y    0.74 
United States  X    0.49    Incr  Y    0.41 
Uruguay     0.52      Y     
Venezuela     0.79  PC  Decr      0.74 
Vietnam     0.74           
Zambia     0.50    Decr       








th member is the EU; 
b Estimation period 1986-2004; 
c Mon means ‘monopoly not rejected’, PC 
indicates ‘perfect competition not rejected’, Mon/PC implies both monopoly and perfect competition not 
rejected (Bikker et al., 2006a); 
d ‘Incr’ means that the H statistic increases significantly over time and 
‘Decr’ refers to a significant decrease, both based on a one-sided t-test (Bikker and Spierdijk, 2008); 
e Y 
means significantly lower H values for larger banks, reflecting more market power, N signifies a 
significantly lower H value (Bikker et al., 2006b); 
f Estimation period 1994-2001;
 
 Table A.2  Number of banks and concentration ratios over the period 1990-2005 
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 Chart A.3  Recursive least squares estimates of the H statistic 
34 
  
                                                 
34 Rolling-window or recursive estimates of the H statistic start with estimates of the first few years, 
continue with estimates of the first years, and successively add data of one extra year to the sample, 
using ever larger subsets of the data. Confidence bounds have been shown by dotted lines. 